1) “Analysis of an Electronic Voting System,” a July 23, 2003, study by computer scientists from Rice and Johns Hopkins universities, specifically focused on a Diebold source code obtained over the Internet: “Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts.”
2) The state of Maryland commissioned its own risk-assessment study of Diebold, which contained a direct response to the Rice-Johns Hopkins study: “The State of Maryland procedural controls and general voting environment reduce or eliminate many of the vulnerabilities identified in the Rubin report. However, these controls, while sufficient to help mitigate the weaknesses identified in the July 23 report, do not, in many cases meet the standard of best practice or the State of Maryland Security Policy. … This Risk Assessment has identified several high-risk vulnerabilities. … If these vulnerabilities are exploited, significant impact could occur on the accuracy, integrity, and availability of election results.”
3) The Ohio secretary of state studied systems submitted by ES&S, Diebold, Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia, and identified risk areas for each system, classified as low, medium, or high risk. It then broke out the “most significant” risk areas that required immediate attention:
Diebold
Overall Risks: 17; “Most Significant” Risks: 5
ES&S
Overall Risks: 17; “Most Significant” Risks: 3
Hart
Overall Risks: 12; “Most Significant” Risks: 4
Sequoia
Overall Risks: 19; “Most Significant” Risks: 7
This article appears in February 20 • 2004.