What the Studies Say
Research studies on the various electronic voting systems have stopped well short of enthusiastic endorsement
2) The state of Maryland commissioned its own risk-assessment study of Diebold, which contained a direct response to the Rice-Johns Hopkins study: "The State of Maryland procedural controls and general voting environment reduce or eliminate many of the vulnerabilities identified in the Rubin report. However, these controls, while sufficient to help mitigate the weaknesses identified in the July 23 report, do not, in many cases meet the standard of best practice or the State of Maryland Security Policy. ... This Risk Assessment has identified several high-risk vulnerabilities. ... If these vulnerabilities are exploited, significant impact could occur on the accuracy, integrity, and availability of election results."
3) The Ohio secretary of state studied systems submitted by ES&S, Diebold, Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia, and identified risk areas for each system, classified as low, medium, or high risk. It then broke out the "most significant" risk areas that required immediate attention:
Overall Risks: 17; "Most Significant" Risks: 5
Overall Risks: 17; "Most Significant" Risks: 3
Overall Risks: 12; "Most Significant" Risks: 4
Overall Risks: 19; "Most Significant" Risks: 7